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“Whoever controls the Middle East controls the world’s energy and wealth . . . whoever dominates the Middle 
East can rule the entire world, too.”   
—Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, January 31, 2010 
 
Starting in the 1970s, Iran developed a deep interest in nuclear power, which it steadfastly main-
tained was exclusively for peaceful purposes. It joined the nuclear nonproliferation treaty (NPT), 
where it was a member in good standing, allowed international safeguards and inspections from the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and entered into commercial contracts for civilian 
technologies. Some observers acknowledged the prospect of Iran aspiring to become a nuclear wea-
pons state, but it was seen as a distant possibility whose outline could only be vaguely glimpsed far on 
the horizon.  
During the last decade, however, Iran’s ambitions have come into sharper focus. It became increa-
singly clear that Iran was interested in mastering the full fuel cycle—especially uranium enrich-
ment—and, moreover, had taken impressive steps to realize this ambition. Some voices remained in 
denial, claiming that Iran would never build the bomb. Others maintained that Iran could never be 
allowed to acquire a nuclear arsenal—that such an outcome was “unacceptable.” They warned that a 
nuclear-armed Tehran would trigger a proliferation chain reaction in the region, perhaps fatally un-
dermine the NPT and nonproliferation regime, threaten neighboring countries, embolden radical 
forces across the Middle East, and disrupt the stability of the global oil market. During the 2007–
2008 presidential campaign, all the major candidates went on the record to this end, even suggesting 
that the United States would use military force if necessary (“all options are on the table”). President 
Obama repeated this formula less than ten days after taking office. 
However, in the past year or so, more voices have been arguing that “well, maybe we can cope with 
a nuclear-armed Iran after all.” James M. Lindsay and Ray Takeyh make this argument in the 
March/April issue of Foreign Affairs, in their article “After Iran Gets the Bomb: How Washington 
Can Limit the Damage from Iran’s Nuclear Defiance.” It is unclear whether this line of thinking con-
stitutes prudent planning, or reflects greater “realism,” or appreciates that sanctions and other poli-
cies short of war will not effectively deter Iran’s nuclear ambitions, or recognizes that a military strike 
has priced itself out of the market, or whether it is simply a case of the United States unilaterally de-
fining success downwards. Perhaps it is some combination of all the above. What is clear is that the 
formerly “unacceptable” has become acceptable for more people than before, both inside and outside 
the government. In a few more years, it may even become conventional wisdom. 
 The instructions for this paper were to accept this premise and to not fight the scenario of an Iran 
with nuclear weapons. It avoids repeat the arguments used in the two previous, excellent papers by 
Frederick Kagan and Kenneth M. Pollack. Instead, it addresses the likely consequences for the region 
of an Iran with nuclear weapons. In broad terms, there are three options. Expressed in academic jar-
gon, they are: 
 
– Self-help: in which some of Iran’s neighbors decide that they cannot place their country at the mer-
cy of Iran’s mullahs and cannot place their trust in the United States or the collective will of puta-
tive security partners, and so decide to enhance their own defense by improving their conventional 




– Bandwagoning: in which Iran’s neighbors (with the exception of Israel) move to tailor their domes-
tic and foreign policies to accommodate Tehran’s preferences. 
 
– Balancing: in which Iran’s neighbors (including Israel) move closer to the United States or form 
some type of collective security arrangement (perhaps with the United States as a member) as a 
way to resist and counter the increase in Iranian power. 
Self-Help 
This scenario has received the most attention from scholars and policymakers. The fear that some 
states in the region would move toward acquiring nuclear weapons tends to, first, overlook the rela-
tive ease and attractiveness of enhancing conventional military capabilities and, second, minimizes 
the not insignificant hurdles that these states would have to surmount to build a nuclear arsenal.  
The premise behind placing greater reliance on conventional capabilities is that Iran would be 
largely unable to use its nuclear weapons for coercive purposes. One lesson from the Cold War is 
that nuclear weapons are most credible for defending national territory and extremists. This role for 
nuclear weapons is unlikely to be different in Iran’s case. Indeed, it is expected that Iranian leaders 
would announce their new nuclear status by also trumpeting that the Islamic Republic—and the 
revolution—is now safeguarded from external threats.  
The risk is not so much that Iran would actually employ or threaten to employ nuclear weapons 
offensively against neighboring states, but rather that it would be emboldened by their possession to 
use its conventional forces aggressively against neighboring states. In this case, enhanced conven-
tional capabilities by countries in the region would be useful to deter and, if necessary, repel an Ira-
nian attack. The Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) states and Iraq would therefore be expected to 
purchase greater conventional military capabilities.  
 In fact, the GCC states have already begun to do so. The Obama administration has been working 
closely with Saudi Arabia and the other GCC states to expedite arms sales and upgrade defensive 
systems, especially for the protection of oil fields. It is expected that this trend will continue and even 
intensify. 
 Given the enormous disparity in forces (especially in manpower and missiles) between any of the 
GCC states and Iran, however, some GCC states may be uncomfortable relying solely on even en-
hanced conventional forces. Nuclear weapons, on the other hand, would be the ultimate force multip-
lier and would create a mutual balance of terror with Iran.  
As superficially attractive as this option may appear, it seems unlikely that there will be an auto-
matic, headlong push for independent nuclear weapons programs. There will be no crash programs. 
There will be no rush for the exits, sauve qui peut.  
One reason is that the indigenous acquisition of nuclear weapons is a long process. (It is also ex-
pensive, but for the GCC states, expense would not be an issue. For Egypt and Jordan it would be.)  
  There is no gainsaying the amount of time it would take to acquire the human capital and technical 
capability to build nuclear weapons. It is not as easy in practice as it may look on paper. Proliferation 
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is not a light switch that can be automatically flipped; it is the steady movement along a continuum of 
capabilities. A state may decide to pursue a clandestine, dedicated nuclear weapons program or build 
a civilian nuclear capability and only later decide whether to build nuclear weapons. Either way, it 
means many years of heightened external scrutiny and vulnerability to economic sanctions, and mili-
tary strikes by more powerful states. 
 There is another factor that will also influence proliferation in the region: the “enemy gets a vote.” 
Iran’s behavior as a nuclear weapons state may be crucial to shaping the nuclear decision-making of 
its neighbors.  
 For example, would countries in the region act differently if Iran deliberately kept its nuclear ar-
senal small? If it outlined a nuclear doctrine that explained that these weapons were for defensive 
purposes only? If its leaders spoke only of “minimum deterrence” to “protect the revolution”? (If Te-
hran translated Pierre Gallois into Farsi?) If it decided not to deploy any operational nuclear weapons 
and went to some lengths to signal that fact? What if it decided not to test any nuclear devices at all? 
After all, a program that used enriched uranium may not need to test nuclear devices to have confi-
dence they would work, especially if Tehran had already received blueprints and technical assistance 
from other countries such as Pakistan, South Africa and Russia. And without a test, how worried 
would other states (Israel excepted) really be? Even if Washington considered Iran to be nuclear 
armed, would the region take the word of a United States that had been wrong on Iraq’s weapons of 
mass destruction (WMD) programs?  
To turn from the general to the specific, the nonproliferation literature identifies three countries 
as being most worthy of concern: Turkey, Egypt, and Saudi Arabia.  
Turkey possesses the industrial infrastructure and technical and scientific base to build its own 
nuclear weapons, given enough time. But Turkey is already a member of an alliance, North Atlantic 
Treaty Organization (NATO), which has the potential to provide more security collectively than any-
thing Ankara could muster on its own. The key question would then turn on trust or credibility—
could Turkey rely on NATO to deter a nuclear-armed Iran and come to its defense if deterrence fails?  
There are both declaratory and substantive steps that NATO could take to reassure Ankara. For 
example, NATO could use its declaratory policy to emphasize the alliance’s firm commitment to 
Turkey’s defense. It is also possible that Turkey may request that NATO station nuclear weapons on 
its territory as added confirmation of this commitment. (There is historical precedent here.) Undoub-
tedly, there are other ways of reassuring Turkey as well.  
By virtue of its size and history in the Arab world, Egypt is often mentioned as a possible prolifera-
tor and has been since the 1960s. Yet does anyone think that Israel would tolerate a nuclear-armed 
Egypt or even an Egypt that was inclining in that direction? Knowing that, would Cairo even try to go 
this route? After all, Israel has already struck preemptively twice in the past few decades to prevent 
neighbors from acquiring nuclear capabilities. There is no reason to expect that it would be willing to 
give Egypt a pass, and no reason that Egypt would not already know that.  
That leaves Saudi Arabia, which in some ways is the most interesting potential proliferator in the 
wake of a nuclear-armed Iran. Saudi Arabia faces the same challenges of a long R&D lead time and 
the threat of an Israeli preemptive strike as Egypt. But few observers have ever thought that Riyadh 
was interested in or capable of indigenously developing nuclear weapons. It would be far easier for 
Saudi Arabia to rely on Pakistan.  
 At first (or even second) glance, this scenario seems plausible given religious affinities and shared 
strategic interests. Pakistan has the goods, Saudi Arabia has the funds. There have been rumors and 
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reports for years that the two countries have a secret nuclear pact whereby Pakistan will transfer nuc-
lear weapons to Saudi Arabia at Riyadh’s request. This agreement may exist.(This might best be cha-
racterized as a case of “just in time” proliferation.)  
But how plausible, really, is this scenario? From Islamabad’s perspective, it is already operating 
under the weight of the damage that A.Q. Khan inflicted on the nonproliferation regime and so may 
be reluctant to be the first country in history to sell nuclear weapons to another state. Even if that is 
not enough to halt the sale (and it may not be), Saudi Arabia would be wary of having these weapons 
transferred to its territory in advance of any crisis. First, there would be no urgent security threat to 
address. Second, Riyadh would fear being exposed if the shipment was caught. And third, if the wea-
pons arrived safely, Saudi Arabia would then have to worry about Israel learning of the transfer and 
its subsequent vulnerability to an Israeli preemptive strike. (An additional challenge for Riyadh 
would be maintaining these weapons, but this could theoretically be handled by Pakistani techni-
cians.)  
And if there was a crisis with Iran, it would hardly be the optimal time to transfer nuclear weapons. 
The United States would have increased its physical military presence in the region. The region 
would also have come under greater surveillance by the United States and others, which would in-
crease the risk of having a shipment detected and interdicted. (It is likely that U.S. warships and sur-
veillance assets would be on alert for just this type of transfer.) And during a crisis, it is inconceivable 
that the United States would not be heavily involved both militarily and diplomatically with Riyadh 
to provide reassurance about Washington’s commitment to its defense and thus prevent the percep-
tion that Riyadh would need to rely on Pakistan’s nuclear weapons in the first place.  
The bottom line is that the transfer of Pakistani nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia, whether “early” 
or “late,” presents significant challenges. Riyadh could not be confident that it could gain operational 
control over such weapons or, if such control was gained, that it could be maintained for very long. 
Bandwagoning 
Iran’s neighbors would have the ability to select what form of bandwagoning they preferred: a formal 
de facto or de jure alliance, a “soft” accommodation, or something in between.  
Formal bandwagoning between Middle Eastern states and Iran is unlikely. It is hard to conceive, at 
this moment, that any of the GCC states, Egypt, Jordan, or Turkey would formally align themselves 
with a nuclear-armed Iran. Strategic interests are too much opposed, religious and cultural differenc-
es too large, wariness of Tehran’s ability to arouse their Shia populations too great, and the attrac-
tiveness of the existing security arrangements too strong.  
Any tilt toward Tehran, if it occurs, would likely be less definitive than a formal alliance. Perhaps 
most likely is that Iran’s neighbors would start to subtly accommodate themselves to Tehran. This 
might take the shape of “diplomatic deconflicting,” taking extra care to ensure that relations remain 
friendly. Increasing the size of their diplomatic missions in Tehran, welcoming Iranian officials to the 
capitals with full honors, inviting Iranian officials to attend GCC meetings, sponsoring cultural ex-
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changes—there are a host of ways in which Iran’s neighbors might want to signal a more accommo-
dating stance.  
Midway between a formal alliance and some “soft” accommodation would lie a number of worri-
some measures that would suggest these states’ susceptibility to Iran’s growing influence. Examples 
would include the oil-producers among these countries parroting the Iranian line on pricing; Iranian 
pressure to downsize the U.S. and Western presence in these countries, especially U.S. military bases 
in Iraq and the Gulf; Iranian pressure not to purchase Western military equipment; Iranian pressure 
to oppose steps toward an Israeli-Palestinian peace agreement; and Iranian pressure to help Tehran 
avoid the full consequences of economic sanctions (should they remain in place after it had become a 
nuclear weapons state).  
Balancing 
In summer 2009, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton proposed the creation of a “security umbrella” 
for states in the region if Iran were to acquire nuclear weapons. Such a security umbrella would be 
designed to both deter Iran and reassure the United States’ friends in the region.  
How much confidence would these countries have in the United States after it has decided to ac-
cept the previously “unacceptable”—that is, a nuclear-armed Iran? Expressed bluntly, would they 
entrust their future security to the United States? 
Recent history suggests they may hesitate. The United States has not done a very good job of de-
terring Iran’s misbehavior in the past, even omitting its failure to halt the nuclear weapons program 
(under this scenario). Iran has been interfering in Iraq and Afghanistan for years; it is responsible for 
the deaths of U.S. servicemen and women. It has supported, armed, and supplied Hezbollah in south-
ern Lebanon. It supports Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad in Gaza and the West Bank. Frederick 
Kagan’s paper contains additional examples. 
So what type of behavior would it take to reassure these countries that, this time, the United States 
would act credibly to defend their interests when it appears to have been reluctant to defend its own? 
(There is also the related question of whether they would trust America’s judgment—that the United 
States would act wisely as well.) Is confidence in the United States waxing or waning? If it was a 
stock, would a GCC investor decide to go long or short it?  
These states will have a menu of security options to choose from. Balancing with the United States 
could take many forms. These range from declaratory statements to formal agreements to enhanced 
diplomatic interaction to de jure alliances, including an enhanced GCC with the United States as a 
member. Would American security assurances be sufficient to reassure the GCC states? Would they 
require a formal security assurance or security guarantee? Would they demand a treaty with a 
NATO-like Article V provision for “automatic” involvement? Would off-shore balancing be suffi-
cient? After all, navies come and navies go. Would they welcome a greater U.S. military presence in 
the region—boots on the ground—with more U.S. troops, trainers, ships, and jets actually based on 
their territory?  
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 Or would these states be interested in a collective security arrangement with the United States as a 
member? The GCC states already have a security framework and there have recently been some calls 
for it to expand its membership to include Egypt, Jordan, and Iraq. But the GCC has so far been less 
than the sum of its parts, an organization of proud, highly competitive, and not terribly cooperative 
states. It is always possible that a nuclear-armed Iran would concentrate their attention and compel 
them to band together; pool resources; engage in joint planning, training, and operations; invite the 
United States to join; and generally start to act like an alliance. But there is nothing in their individual 
or collective histories that would suggest that this will happen or that they would do so by them-
selves.  
It is hard to know in advance which of these options or which collection of these options would be 
attractive to each of Iran’s neighbors. But there are at least two potential problems with balancing 
Iran by moving closer to the United States.  
First, if the Soviet-American competition is any model, at some point these states may start to 
worry that U.S. declaratory policy and force deployments would run the risk of provoking Iran and 
exacerbating a tough situation. During the Reagan administration especially, Europeans voiced great 
concern that Washington was needlessly and recklessly provoking the Soviet Union.1 The same geo-
political fact would apply to the Gulf as it did to Europe—they are very close to the threat and the 
United States is very far away. That fact alone will make calibrating the right “amount of security” a 
challenge for future U.S. administrations.  
Second, greater reliance on the United States by countries in the Middle East would play directly 
into the narrative that Osama bin Laden has been preaching for the past decade and a half: that these 
countries are run by venal apostates who are propped up on their thrones by Washington; together, 
they are robbing the Arab and Muslim people of their spiritual and financial inheritance. It is ex-
pected that these rulers would be sensitive to such claims and be torn between their fear of the exter-
nal threat of Iran, which would push them toward the United States, and their fear of the internal 
threat of religiously fueled unrest and instability, which would push them away from the United 
States. (Iran, of course, has a variety of means to sharpen this dilemma for the GCC states.) In either 
case, this dilemma will further complicate the United States’ ability to manage security in the region.  
None of these three options—self-help, bandwagoning, or balancing—is optimal from the pers-
pective of states in the Middle East (or of the United States). None completely solves the security and 
political dilemmas that a nuclear-armed Iran would present.  
Under the circumstances, the most likely outcome is for countries in the region not to go “all-in” 
on any one of these approaches. Rather, they would hedge their bets among these options, constantly 
calibrating how much or how little of each approach would be prudent, but with the goal of providing 
them with as much flexibility and room for maneuver as possible.  
And these states may not just hedge between two options, but “double-hedge”—pursue a combi-
nation of all three options simultaneously. For example, they would not only continue to acquire ad-
vanced conventional weapons and perhaps explore some civil nuclear technologies, but would also 
want to rely more heavily on the United States and make nice with (or at least not gratuitously aggra-
vate) Iran. The more skillful among them would try to play Washington and Tehran off each other to 





Finally, a few words about what might be called the “false comfort” of “red lines.” As part of the ar-
gument that the United States could preserve its interests in a Middle East where Tehran had nuclear 
weapons, a number of scholars have written that Washington would need to reassert its interests by 
unambiguously declaring that there were now red lines beyond which the Iranians could not trespass. 
In their Foreign Affairs article, Lindsay and Takeyh outline three such red lines: no initiation of con-
ventional warfare against other countries, no use or transfer of nuclear weapons, materials or tech-
nologies, and no stepped-up support for terrorist or subversive activities. Should Iran cross any of 
these lines, the United States would respond with military force, up to and including the use of nuc-
lear weapons. 
No doubt the articulation of red lines may provide a synthetic sense of security and the feeling of 
some control over a situation that has clearly gone badly. Proponents of this view may also believe 
that this type of rhetorical muscle-flexing will help inoculate them from criticism that they are being 
overly fatalistic or defeatist on the subject of halting Iran’s nuclear ambitions.  
The use of red lines should not be completely dismissed in all circumstances. Yet here it raises two 
questions. First, a nonnuclear Iran has already been engaging in at least some of these activities and 
the United States has not responded militarily or even very forcefully. Why would a nuclear-armed 
and swaggeringly self-confident Iran worry overly about the United States now objecting to behavior 
that it has previously tolerated for years?  
 Second, why would the United States be more willing to use military force after Iran has acquired 
nuclear weapons than beforehand? If the United States now decides that it would no longer tolerate 
such behavior, the situation would then seem ripe for miscalculation by decision-makers in Tehran, 






                                                                      
1. An excellent example of this thinking is Michael Howard, “Reassurance and Deterrence: Western Defense in the 1980s,” Foreign 
Affairs, vol. 61, no. 2 (Winter 1982), pp. 309–24.  
